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NOTES ON THE MULTIPLE FACETS OF IMMIGRATION
FEDERALISM
Rick Su*
Immigration is a national issue and a federal responsibility. To describe it
solely in those terms today seems almost wistfully passe. There is increasing
skepticism as to the federal government's willingness or ability to regulate
immigration in the twenty-first century. At the same time, there appears to be
growing enthusiasm for an increased sub-federal role. Frustration with
immigration at the state and local level in recent years has led to a multitude of
(albeit, relatively identical) local laws concerning immigration. Even the federal
government is beginning to change its stance on the role of states and localities
with respect to issues like immigration enforcement. I Thus, to the extent that an
era of federal exclusivity over immigration ever existed, it appears to be slowly
giving way to one in which multiple tiers of government play a role - a model
many are now referring to as immigration federalism.
2
* Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo Law School. Thanks to the
participants of this symposium for their insightful remarks, many of which were inspirations for
my ideas here, and members of the Tulsa Journal of Comparative & International Law for the
invitation and putting together a wonderful symposium. In addition, special thanks to Jim Gardner
for his thoughtful comments and suggestions about this essay.
1. See Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008), (describing and analyzing immigration regulation efforts at the local level);
see Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008) (signaling the federal government's eagerness to embrace sub-federal activity
on the issue); see Anil Kalhan, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Implications of Interior
Immigration Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1137, 1157-68 (discussing the effects of state
and local efforts to regulate); see generally NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2007
ENACTED STATE LEGISLATION RELATED TO IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRATION (2008),
http://www.ncsl.org/print/immig/2007Immigrationfinal.pdf (listing sub-federal regulatory activity
at the state level).
2. See Huntington, supra note 1; see Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration
Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1635-1636 (1997); see generally Christina M. Rodriguez, The
Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008) (offering a
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What exactly does immigration federalism mean? This essay takes as its
starting point the contestable position that some degree of immigration
federalism is both constitutionally permissible and politically desirable. 3  It
suggests that liberating the issue of immigration from the shadows of federal
exclusivity does not necessarily tell us much about what a conceptual framework
of immigration federalism should or will actually be like. This is not solely a
function of the difficulties inherent in incorporating principles of federalism into
what is usually understood to be an exclusive federal field of immigration.
Much of the current immigration jurisprudence exhibits strong concerns with
federalist principles and is a consequence of the rifts and tensions that underlie
the very concept and promise of federalism itself. Because of this, the stake of
immigration federalism cannot help but be driven into contested grounds.
This essay is an initial foray into the issues that arise when some of the
complexities of the federalism discourse are superimposed on the emerging field
of immigration federalism. It does so by exploring the contemporary issues
surrounding immigration through the lens of three different understandings of
our federalist structure: as dueling sovereigns, transacting parties, and
overlapping communities. For each, I examine the body of case law relevant to
its particular approach, and explore how it intersects with existing immigration
jurisprudence. In addition, I consider how these frameworks inform the current
debate over sub-federal involvement with immigration regulations.
These three approaches are not intended to serve as a comprehensive list of
how federalism can be conceptualized, nor do they constitute the only way of
approaching immigration federalism. If anything, they raise more questions than
they resolve with respect to the relative roles of the federal government and the
states in the field of immigration. That being said, these frames offer a way of
talking about immigration federalism which goes beyond simply applying
general "values of federalism" 4 to the field of immigration regulation and
enforcement. Ultimately, these forms suggest that the best way to tackle this
issue is to refrain from seeing immigration jurisprudence as distinct and separate
reformulation of the presumptions of federalism in the context of immigration); see generally Peter
H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57 (2007)
(advocating a more robust state role in the formation of immigration policy).
3. Huntington, supra note 1 (describing convincing arguments for the constitutionality of
some sub-federal role with regard to immigration regulations); Rodriguez, supra note 2, at 611-18;
Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal
Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 493, 527 - 57 (2001); but see Huyen Pham, The
Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration
Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FL. ST. U. L. REv. 965, 987- 98 (2004).
4. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN




from the broader federalism discourse, and instead, to understand it as part of the
ongoing process of balancing the roles of the federal government and the states
in our federalist structure.
I.
One way of understanding immigration federalism is to situate the body of
immigration law concerning federal-state relations within the doctrinal
development of federalism more generally. In other words, instead of seeing
decisions in this area as immigration cases that draw upon the federalism
jurisprudence, this view reads them as constituent parts of the federalism
movement as a whole, and thus inseparable from its overall trajectory. This
framework deviates somewhat from how immigration federalism has been
portrayed in recent years. The common perception is that immigration
federalism involves the introduction of federalism principles into the
immigration discourse. Here we start with the baseline presumption that, not
unlike the jurisprudential struggle over other areas of exclusive federal concern
like interstate commerce, the doctrinal conversation over the scope and nature of
the federal government's immigration powers is a part of the broader federalism
discourse.
This particular view of immigration federalism draws support from two
particular aspects of federalism. The first is the fact that the federalism
jurisprudence cannot be down into a discrete and independent body of case law.
Rather, the judicial construction of our federalist structure emerges from judicial
interpretations of a broad range of constitutional and statutory provisions across
a wide variety of substantive areas. Some "federalism" decisions, like the
Supreme Court's recent anti-commandeering cases, invoke federalism principles
more explicitly and formulate doctrinal rules specifically to serve those ends.
5
In others however, the federalism lesson arises out of the specific, and
sometimes subtle, way that courts resolve a common judicial question like
preemption or jurisdiction, as is often the case in the Supreme Court's
Commerce Clause and sovereign immunity decisions. 6 Thus, in thinking about
immigration federalism, there is not a principled way to separate immigration
cases from federalism cases. To the extent an immigration decision implicates
5. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997).
6. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 64-65 (1996); see, e.g., Egelhoff v.
Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 160-61 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that "in today's world, filled
with legal complexity, the true test of federalist principle may lie, not in the occasional
constitutional effort to trim Congress' commerce power at its edges, or to protect a State's treasury
from a private damages action, but rather in those many statutory cases where courts interpret the
mass of technical detail that is the ordinary diet of the law.") (citations omitted).
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the balance of federal and state power, as they often do, they are inextricably tied
to the development of federalism as a whole.
The second related point is that once we recognize the potential connection
with federalism generally, the established framework of federal exclusivity and
the alternative model of immigration federalism can be understood to be but two• 7
sides of the same coin. The appeal to the model of dual sovereignty and the
fundamental divide between "what is truly national and truly local" that lie at the
heart of the recent federalism revival, 8 are the same principles that underlie the
dominance, or exclusivity, of federal power in the immigration context. 9 What
this demonstrates is that less is gained from the conventional dichotomy of
federal exclusivity and immigration federalism than is ordinarily assumed. The
exclusivity framework can be just as empowering as confining. The true conflict
is at the margins - over what falls within the province of federal exclusivity as
a regulation of immigration and what falls without as an infringement of
traditional state powers.
With this in mind, it is possible to see the bulk of the Supreme Court
immigration jurisprudence not as a lockstep march toward federal supremacy,
but as a nuanced and incomplete federalist struggle - one that is both
historically contingent and ideologically fractured. The judicial federalization of
the immigration power that began in the mid-nineteenth century was not simply
the product of the Court's recognition of immigration as a field of exclusive
federal control. It also involved a substantive re-configuration of the federal-
state relationship and a redrawing of the scope of state police powers, many of
which had been sanctioned and protected as such in preceding decades. 10 When
7. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 918-19.
8. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 599 (2000).
9. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U. S. 581, 605 - 06 (1889) ("The control of
local matters being left to local authorities, and national matters being entrusted to the government
of the Union, the problem of free institutions existing over a widely extended country, having
different climates and varied interests, has been happily solved. For local interests the several
states of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations
[in our immigration policies], we are but one people, one nation, one power.").
10. Compare New York v. Miln, 36 U. S. 102, 142 - 43 (1837) ("We think it as competent and
as necessary for a state to provide precautionary measures against the moral pestilence of paupers,
vagabonds, and possibly convicts; as it is to guard against the physical pestilence, which may arise
from unsound and infectious articles imported, or from a ship, the crew of which may be labouring
under an infectious disease."), and id. at 148 (Thompson, J., concurring) ("Can any thing fall more
directly within the police power and internal regulation of a state, than that which concerns the
care and management of paupers or convicts, or any other class or description of persons that may
be thrown into the country, and likely to endanger its safety, or become chargeable for their
maintenance?"), with Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 259, 271-73, 275 (1875) (acknowledging
a possible role for police powers with regard to certain ills of immigration, but employing a limited
[Vol. 15:2
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the federal government's plenary power over immigration was cemented in Chae
Chan Ping, the opinion was framed primarily within the federalist divide
between spheres of national and local interests, which the Court translated into
spheres of federal and state control. It was clear even then, however, that a
field as potentially expansive as immigration would not lend itself easily to clear
federalist delineations. Thus, from Yick Wo v. Hopkins 12 to Ohio v.
Deckebach,1 3  Terrace v. Thompson 14 to Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Commission, 15 the Court continued to refine the boundaries of state and federal
power. At the same time, perhaps not surprisingly, the fundamental structure of
federal power 16 and the role of the federal government in American society
17
were undergoing profound and arguably irreversible changes.
As the current controversy over the state and local role with regard to
immigration illustrates, this jurisprudential refinement is far from finished. This
is certainly due, in no small part, to the changing nature of the immigration
controversy - especially the recent focus on illegal immigration. Moreover, as
legal commentators and jurists have recognized, shifts in our understanding of
equal protection and due process have similarly complicated what is accepted
doctrine and what continues to be left unresolved. 18  However, the changing
reading of Miln and police powers to strike down a statute that sought to regulate immigration for
similar purposes).
11. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U. S. at 605.
12. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (striking down a local laundry licensing law
that was applied in a discriminatory manner against Chinese immigrants).
13. Ohio v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 394 (1927) (upholding a local ordinance that forbids
noncitizen immigrants from running billiard and pool halls, accepting as rational the justification
"that the maintenance of billiard and pool rooms by them is a menace to society and to the public
welfare, and that the ordinance is a reasonable police regulation passed in the interest of and for the
benefit of the public.").
14. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 223 (1923) (upholding a state law that prevented
certain immigrants from having any interest in land because of the strong state interests involved).
15. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420-21 (1948) (finding state interest
insufficient to justify forbidding noncitizen immigrants from receiving commercial fishing
licenses).
16. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at
244-45 (1988) (arguing that civil rights amendments and legislation following the conclusion of the
Civil War effectuated a shift in federal and state power).
17. See DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND
WAR, 1929-1945, at 363-80 (noting how the New Deal expanded the role of the federal
government in American society).
18. See generally Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology
and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 257 (2000) (assessing immigration doctrines with a view to contemporary equal
protection and other constitution doctrines); see also Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of
2008]
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terrain of federalism has played a role as well. Indeed, it can be argued that
many of the immigration precedents at the heart of the most recent controversy
over sub-federal regulations of immigration are better understood through the
ongoing effort to define the substantive and procedural protections that our
structure of federalism guarantees. In other words, the indeterminate state of
immigration federalism is not solely due to doctrinal uncertainties in
immigration law; it is also the product of the ongoing battle over the doctrine of
federalism.
Take, for example, the Supreme Court's decision in De Canas v. Bica. 19 At
its most basic level, De Canas is the latest in a long line of Supreme Court cases
addressing the ability of states to regulate immigration and immigrant
residents. Unlike most previous cases, however, the regulation at issue
targeted illegal immigrants, and thus facially skirted many of the equal
protection and foreign treaty concerns that plagued earlier cases in this line.
Upholding a California statute that imposed penalties upon employers that hired
illegal immigrants at a time when the federal government had yet to regulate in
this area, De Canas is often cited for the observation that "the Court has never
held that every state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation
of immigration and thus per se pre-empted." 21 In the courts, however, it is
better known today for giving rise to a three-part preemption analysis.
Federal immigration laws have changed in many ways since De Canas was
decided, which lessens the relevance of some of the Court's specific findings.
22
Nevertheless, the three-part inquiry derived from the opinion by the lower courts
- (1) whether the state is regulating immigration as such, (2) whether its
activity is contrary to Congress's clear and manifest intent otherwise, and (3)
whether it is regulating in a way that stands as an obstacle to federal objectives
- survives as the predominant test for determining the state's role with respect
to immigration.
23
Although De Canas survives today primarily in the form of this top-down
preemption analysis centered on the scope and content of federal law and
congressional intent, it is worth noting that the decision was not so limited in its
original incarnation. Indeed, after setting forth the established truism that the
Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 1625 (1992) (assessing immigration doctrines with a view to evolving due process law).
19. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
20. E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); e.g., Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
21. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355.
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006) (preempting "any State or local law imposing civil or criminal
sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or
refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.").
23. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 905 F.Supp. 755, 768 (C.D.Cal. 1995).
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"[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal
power," 24 the Court went on to ground a substantial portion of its reasoning on a
substantive and tangible conceptualization of state autonomy. This concept
actively affirmed the vital role of states with regard to legitimate and, in the
Court's view, laudable local goals and interests.
Recalling the bottom-up approach of earlier decisions, 25 the De Canas
Court spent considerable time probing and identifying the various state pursuits
that would be foreclosed by preemption, and the consequences that foreclosure
would have on the ability of the states to address pressing local problems. The
Court emphasized that "[s]tates possess broad authority under their police
powers to regulate the employment relationship to protect workers within the
State" before noting "[c]hild labor laws, minimum and other wage laws, laws
affecting occupational health and safety, and workmen's compensation laws [as]
only a few examples." 26  It then sought to describe California's attempt to
regulate the employment of illegal immigrants in those terms before concluding
the regulation in question was one primarily concerned with "protect[ing]
California's fiscal interests and lawfully resident labor force from the deleterious
effects on its economy resulting from the employment of illegal aliens," by
"focus[ing] directly upon these essentially local problems and is tailored to
combat effectively the perceived evils."' 27 These sentiments set much of the tone
for the legal analysis that followed.
It is easy to dismiss these remarks as dicta, just as it is easy to write off the
Court's assumptions about the deleterious effects of illegal immigration or the
efficacy of California's response. If De Canas is understood as simply a
preemption decision, it is easy to view this as an irrelevant divergence since it
did not directly relate to the preemptive scope of federal law nor was it contrary
to the intent of congress. The prominence of these comments, however, suggests
that De Canas may have been attempting to invoke a broader context - one
over state autonomy and federalism - in its decision. This connection is even
more striking when one considers the degree to which the language in De Canas
parallels the substantive state autonomy frame set forth that same term in
National League of Cities v. Usery.2 8  There, the Court's invocation of the
myriad public and state interests that would be stifled if a sphere of state
autonomy immune to federal preemption was not recognized, 29 seems to echo
24. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 354.
25. See New York v. Miln, 36 U. S. 102, 139 (1837); see Clark v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392,
397 (1927).
26. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 356.
27. Idat 356-57.
28. See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976).
29. See id. at 848.
2008]
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De Canas's fear regarding the scope of state power if federal preemption in the
immigration context is applied too eagerly or willingly by the courts.
30
Moreover, in distinguishing prior decisions in part on the ground that, to the
extent those cases were premised upon the "predominance of federal interest in
the fields of immigration and foreign affairs, there would not appear to be similar
interest in a situation in which the state law is fashioned to remedy local
problems, and operates only on local employers," 31 De Canas seems to be
anticipating the balance-of-interest federalism that would emerge out of National
League of Cities.
32
In making this comparison, I do not intend to paper over the important
distinctions between De Canas and National League of Cities. De Canas's
concerns about state autonomy led it to merely limit the preemptive scope of the
federal government's exclusive power over immigration by requiring a clearer
statement of congressional intent. National League of Cities expressly denied the
supremacy and applicability of a federal law based on the federal government's
exclusive power over interstate commerce on similar grounds.
As many federalism scholars have noted, one should not be too quick to
dismiss or underestimate the very real federalism norms that can arise from
judicial soft checks 33 like the clear statement rule invoked by the Court in De
Canas.34 Nevertheless, the particular expansiveness of the National League of
Cities doctrine together with its pronounced lack of constitutional support raised
("The State might wish to employ persons with little or no training, or those who wish to work on
a casual basis, or those who for some other reason do not possess minimum employment
requirements, and pay them less than the federally prescribed minimum wage. It may wish to offer
part-time or summer employment to teenagers at a figure less than the minimum wage, and if
unable to do so may decline to offer such employment at all. But the Act would forbid such
choices by the States.").
30. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 366-61 (quoting San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,
243 (1959)).
31. Id. at 363.
32. The balancing inquiry is not mentioned in the lead opinion, but arises in Justice Powell's
concurrence. See Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("I may
misinterpret the Court's opinion, but it seems to me that it adopts a balancing approach.").
Nevertheless, as Justice Powell argues later, many of the early attempts to apply National League
of Cities followed a balancing approach. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528, 562 - 63 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (describing the Court's approach in EEOC v.
Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226 (1983) and Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U. S. 678, 688
(1982)).
33. See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1, 47-49
(2004).
34. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 358 (adopting "the clear and manifest purpose of Congress"
standard of Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146 (1963)).
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immediate and substantial concerns. 35 Indeed, it is a large part of why Justice
Brennan, who authored De Canas, wrote the leading dissent in National League
of Cities;36 and the reason that De Canas remains good law while National
League of Cities has long been discredited and overruled.
37
Despite the differences in their doctrinal result, the parallels between the
two are just as revealing. Though directed at different aspects of federal power,
one can see the two as but counterparts in the same federalist movement. Just as
National League of Cities can be traced to concerns about continued expansion
of the federal government's exclusive power over interstate commerce, De
Canas appears to be similarly concerned about the risks that expansive doctrines
of federal exclusivity with regard to issues like immigration pose for state
autonomy and the structure of federalism more generally. In other words, in
emphasizing that not all state regulations that affect immigration or immigrants
should be read as immigration regulations, the Court in De Canas appears to be
setting the groundwork for National League of Cities. By expressing the
concern that continued proliferation and expansion of so-called exclusive federal
fields like immigration (and later, the Commerce Clause) might be the Trojan
horse that subverts the careful balance of our structure of federalism, the implicit
seemed to be an "anxious sense that the lines purportedly separating national and
state powers were no longer practicable or even consistently detectable."
' 38
Despite the sense of exceptionalism that tends to pervade immigration law,
the Court's description of the federal government's immigration powers is quite
similar to the Court's treatment of the federal government's power over
interstate commerce. 39  De Canas described the immigration power as
unquestionably and exclusively a federal power but warned that not "every state
enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and
thus per se pre-empted by this constitutional power, whether latent or
exercised." 4 0  With minimal alterations, this explanation can easily be used to
summarize the Court's description of the federal government's power over
35. See Martha A. Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of
a Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV. L. REv. 84, 96 (arguing that National League of Cities, like the
Lochner doctrine, "rests on a relatively weak constitutional foundation .... [P]roponents of state
immunity have had difficulty tying their new doctrine to specific constitutional language or even
any constitutional provision.").
36. See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 860 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("My Brethren thus have today manufactured an abstraction without substance, founded neither in
the words of the Constitution nor on precedent.").
37. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530-31 (1985).
38. PURCELL, supra note 4, at 162.
39. See generally Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283 (1849) (tracing the powers' doctrinal lineage to
a point of intersection).
40. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
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interstate commerce - one that is exclusively within the jurisdiction of federal
authorities, 4 1 but tempered by the understanding that not all regulations that
affect interstate constitute regulation per se.42
That being said, the Court is correct to be concerned in both De Canas and
National League of Cities. Both the Commerce Clause and federal immigration
powers have expanded dramatically since they were specifically allocated to the
federal government, or recognized as such by the Courts. Constitutional
commentators have long noted the tremendous degree to which the Commerce
Clause has broadened federal power, especially as the importance and reach of
the national economy has grown over the years. 43  Moreover, many have
described the recent federalism revival as a result of discomfort on the part of
certain Justices with this expansion and the belief that the federalist structure of
our Constitution requires the Court to actively stem or reverse this trend.
44
A similar story can also be told from the immigration perspective. For a
system originally based on fees and narrow prohibitions centered at the ports-of-
entry and beyond, the federal immigration regime has steadily blossomed into a
far-reaching regulatory system that touches almost every aspect of American
life. Recent developments have only exacerbated this trend. The increasing
number of immigrants in American society today, and the finer distinctions and
statutes employed by federal immigration law to parse both legal and illegal
41. See United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S.Ct.
1786, 1792 - 93 (2007).
("The Commerce Clause provides that 'Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States.' Although the Constitution does not in terms
limit the power of States to regulate commerce, we have long interpreted the Commerce Clause as
an implicit restraint on state authority, even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute.")
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3).
42. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) ("The crucial inquiry [for
commerce clause analysis], therefore, must be directed to determining whether [a particular state
statute] is basically a protectionist measure, or whether it can fairly be viewed as a law directed to
legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental.").
43. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REv.
1387, 1451 - 52 (1987); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995) (describing
decisions that "ushered in an era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence that greatly expanded the
previously defined authority of Congress under that Clause," while recognizing this as in part the
result of "the great changes that had occurred in the way business was carried on in this country.").
44. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 215, 292 (2000) ("[T]he Justices assume that it necessarily falls
on them to define new limits [on federal power] - some limits, any limits, even if those limits
bear no resemblance to anything imagined by the Founders or observed in the past."); Steven G.
Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers ": In Defense of United States v.
Lopez, 94 MicH. L. REv. 752, 752 (1995) ("Even if Lopez produces no progeny and is soon
overruled, the opinion has shattered forever the notion that, after fifty years of Commerce Clause
precedent, we can never go back to the days of limited national power.").
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immigrant residents, suggest not only that federal immigration policy will
continue to affect the operation of state and local governments, but also that
traditional exercises of local power may also become increasing vulnerable to
federal preemption as their effect on immigration and immigrants become more
inevitable. Further, as observers have recently noted, there are few areas, even
those that are left often considered quintessential aspects of state power, that are
unregulated in some way by federal immigration and naturalization laws.
4 5
The question that immigration federalism raises then is not simply how
courts should apply cases like De Canas today, but how developments on the
federalism front affect the next generation of immigration decisions. To be sure,
if De Canas is understood to be a companion to National League of Cities, then
it can be argued that much of the federalism dimensions of the decision were
extinguished when National League of Cities was first narrowed by the Court
and then expressly overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authoriy.46 Toll v. Moreno, decided the same term that Long Island Railroad,
47
continued the Court's practice of narrowly reading National League of Cities,
Justice Brennan appeared to have done the same to his own opinion in De Canas• • 48
through selective citations and a footnote explication.
Though Toll was primarily an equal protection rather than a preemption
decision, the implicit message sent by the Court's opinion on the subject of the
latter did not escape Justice Rehnquist, who in dissent focused his attack on the
majority's casual dismissal of De Canas' stance on preemption and state
autonomy. 49 Considering that the Toll dissenters would later pen some of the
most vigorous and ominous dissents in Garcia,5 0 it is hard not to read Toll's
45. See generally, e.g., Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91
MINN. L. REV. 1625 (2007) (describing how federal immigration laws affect state marriage regime
and sometimes distort their goals and purpose).
46. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
("[Tihe attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of 'traditional
governmental function' is not only unworkable but is also inconsistent with established principles
of federalism and, indeed, with those very federalism principles on which National League of
Cities purported to rest. That case, accordingly, is overruled.").
47. See United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U. S. 678, 682-83 (1982).
48. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 13 n.18 (1982) ("[In De Canas] [w]e rejected the pre-emption
claim not because of an absence of congressional intent to pre-empt, but because Congress
intended that the States be allowed, 'to the extent consistent with federal law, [to] regulate the
employment of illegal aliens."') (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 361 (1976)).
49. See id. at 26-32 (Rehnquist, J. and Burger, C.J., dissenting).
50. See Toll, 458 U.S. at 24-25 (O'Connor, J., Rehnquist, J., and Burger, C.J., dissenting); see
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557-80 (1985) (Powell, J., Burger, C.J.,
Rehnquist, J., and O'Connor, J., dissenting) (warning that National League of Cities would rise
again); id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the principles of National League of
Cities "will, I am confident, in time again command the support of a majority of this Court"); id. at
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treatment of De Canas as a precursor to Garcia's rejection of the substantive
state autonomy framework of National League of Cities.
But De Canas has never been expressly overruled. More importantly,
much of the spirit of National League of Cities has been "revived" in recent
federalism decisions. The potency of the Commerce Clause today is not
necessarily the result of federal overreaching. Instead, it is due in large part to
the way the economic foundation of American society has evolved since its
founding. Nevertheless, since National League of Cities was overruled by
Garcia, the Court has returned to this issue and aggressively sought, most
prominently in Lopez and Morrison, to restore the traditional balance between
state and federal power by limiting the circumstances where the commerce
clause can be invoked, even if it is undisputed that the underlying activity being
regulated has an effect on interstate commerce.51
In doing so, the Court has re-asserted the judiciary's role in guarding the
rampant nature of state power against the encroachment of the Commerce Clause
into regulatory spheres that are more local than federal in nature. As the federal
government continues to expand its regulation of immigration into traditional
areas of local control, or in ways that impede local authority more generally, it is
worth pondering if there is a line that Congress might cross which will trigger a
federalism response in the mold of the Court's Commerce Clause scrutiny.
Already, there are complaints that Congress' anti-sanctuary provisions,
which limit the degree to which states and localities can prohibit governmental
cooperation with federal immigration authorities, hamper local efforts to institute
community policing programs or deliver local services. 52  More than just a
policy concern, however, it raises important questions about whether such an
indirect regulation of immigration, especially one that seems to strike much
deeper into the ability of states to exercise autonomy over traditional spheres of
local control than those involved in either Lopez or Morrison, both of Which had
substantial support from state and local authorities, is consistent with Court's
recent federalism turn.
589 (O'Connor, J., Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I would not shirk the duty
acknowledged by National League of Cities and its progeny, and I share Justice Rehnquist's belief
that this Court will in time again assume its constitutional responsibility.").
51. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (striking down the federal
Violence Against Women Act as beyond the power of Congress to enact under the Commerce
Clause); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-58 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School
Zones Act as beyond the power of Congress to enact under the Commerce Clause).
52. See Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the
Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REv. 1373, 1399-400 (2006) (discussing sanctuary laws
in the United States and whether cooperation with the enforcement of immigration laws is
absolutely required by local governments).
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It is, of course, too early to tell. It has been decades since the Court
addressed the federal-state divide in the immigration context, and the political
and legal terrain of both immigration and federalism has changed substantially
since then. Moreover, there are legitimate concerns about how much of the
substantive state autonomy frame reflected in National League of Cities actually
survives in the recent federalism cases. Many have described this most recent
federalism revival as being more anti-federal than pro-local. 53 There is no doubt
that subtle differences like this will have an impact on how the law evolves in
the immigration context. The analysis here suggests, however, that views on
federalism more generally will likely continue to have a notable influence on this
area of federal immigration law. Since the federalism issue is still far from
resolved, it is unlikely that an established or uncontested framework of
immigration federalism will be possible any time soon.
II.
The language of preemption, autonomy, and sovereign spheres is not the
only way to understand the state and federal role with regard to immigration.
Instead of seeing the federalist system as one of dueling sovereigns competing
for jurisdictional primacy over particular regulatory fields, one can conceive of it
as an intergovernmental marketplace where the federal government and the
states, not unlike private institutions and individuals, negotiate and transact with
one another to find the optimal policy and enforcement mechanism in light of the
underlying interests involved. In short, such an economic or market-based
account emphasizes how the federalist split allows for a more accurate and
efficient accounting of immigration - not only with respect to its costs and
benefits, but also the actual returns that can be expected of various enforcement
or regulatory efforts.
This account complicates our understanding of the federal-state relationship
thus far in a number of ways. First, it requires us to recognize that policymaking
and policy implementation are two distinct steps. The federalist divide with
regard to immigration may provide the ability of the federal government to
establish immigration policy, but it does empower the federal government with
unrestricted access to all governmental resources to implement those policies.
Indeed, one tenet of federalism as it now stands is that federal interests trump
countervailing state interests with regard to issues of national concern such as
immigration. Another strand holds that the federal government has limited
53. See, e.g., David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 62 DUKE L.J. 377,
411 (2001-2002) (discussing the new revival of federalism).
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authority to conscript or commandeer state or local governments to do their
bidding.
54
Second, this account both relies on and draws attention to the fact that
federal and state governments not only have differing interests with respect to
far-reaching issues such as immigration, but that they are also differently situated
with respect to their ability and capacity to address it. In other words, the
immigration policy that the federal government prefers may not necessarily be
the one that it is in the best position to implement vis-A-vis the states, just as the
states may prefer a policy that is cost-prohibitive unless put into place by the
federal government. Taken together, these two aspects reveal the degree of
mutual interdependence contemporary federalism entails.
From this perspective, the legal structure of federalism is not to be
understood solely as a framework for determining which tier prevails when there
is a conflict of interests. Assuming, as many commentators have argued, that a
certain level of cooperation is required between the federal government and the
states to implement most federal policies, federalism then is more importantly
the legal framework within which intergovernmental bargains are struck.
5 5
Thus, the specific contours of federalism are not only important in determining
which tier ultimately decides the policy in a given field, but also which tier is
responsible for its implementation and the bargaining position of each when
cooperative arrangements are sought.
Take for example the Supreme Court's anti-commandeering turn in
federalism, which emerged from two cases in which Court struck down federal
programs that, in its view, sought to accomplish federal aims by commandeering
the state's political process or its fiscal and human resources. First, in New York
v. U.S., the Supreme Court held that the federal government lacked the power to
force a state to choose to take title of low-level radioactive waste generated
within its borders or enact a state program for its disposal. 56 Later, in U.S. v.
Printz, the Court held that the federal government could not conscript local law
enforcement officials to perform background checks on potential gun buyers in
furtherance of a federal program. 57 In both cases, the Court invoked familiar
arguments of state sovereignty to justify its position. 58 Of particular interest,
however, was the Court's pronouncement that the constitutional structure of
54. See infra notes and text accompanying notes 56 - 62.
55. See generally MICHAEL D. REAGAN & JOHN G. SANZONE, THE NEW FEDERALISM 11-13 (2d
ed., Oxford University Press 1981) (discussing cooperative federalism); see also Edward S.
Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. 1 (1950) (detailing a succinct history of
federalism and explaining its importance in the future).
56. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 152, 188 (1992).
57. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
58. See id. at 918; New York, 505 U.S. at 181.
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federalism requires the federal government to internalize the political and
administrative costs of its own programs.
On its face, the Court's anti-commandeering decisions were rooted firmly
in the framework of dual sovereignty. The Court explained this partition in the
enforcement and implementation context as merely an extension of the divide
that exists in the regulatory and policymaking context. 59 Noting the limitations
of the Court's reasoning, however, observers like Roderick Hills have sought to
justify the court's anti-commandeering rule from a different perspective. As
Hills argues, the problem is not that the Court's dual sovereignty or political
accountability rationales fail to justify the anti-commandeering principle, but
rather that the anti-commandeering principle fails to give effect to these
rationales. This is especially true, he adds, when one realizes that despite the
restrictions against commandeering, established judicial doctrines specifically
permit the federal government to achieve similar ends through preemption or
direct regulation of private parties, just as the federal government is allowed to
recruit states to implement its programs through conditional grants of federal aid
or threats of preemption. 61
Taken together, however, Hills argues that organizing federalism around
these all rules is desirable for another reason conducive to our federalist
structure. He asserts that the anti-commandeering baseline established by the
Supreme Court should be understood as a property entitlement that both protects
local power and encourages governmental efficiency. It does so by requiring the
federal government to internalize the cost of its regulatory programs by either
paying for it themselves or purchasing those services from state governments
through conditional grants.
62
If the federal government is in the best position to implement a regulatory
program that serves its interest, then this rule provides the incentive to do so on
its own instead of mandating state assistance, which may be less efficient overall
but enticing for federal policymakers. If the states are in a better position, then
the federal government can still rely on the states by reaching a bargain with
them to implement the federal law. The result is that federal programs are
implemented in a more efficient manner by allowing state services to be solicited
by the federal government. Moreover, because the state is free to assess its own
costs and benefits in the negotiations, state interests and other non-fiscal costs
are factored into the bargain without frustrating federal supremacy on the issue.
Thus, to the extent the anti-commandeering rule promotes federalism; this view
59. See id.
60. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State
Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REv. 813, 817-18 (1998).
61. See id. at 817-18.
62. See id. at 856-58.
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sees the federalist structure as being more concerned about the efficient and
effective working of government that can emerge from intergovernmental
bargaining than any freestanding commitment to limiting federal power or
protecting states as states.
As Hills admits, unlike the dual sovereignty model of federalism, the
economic or market-based model described here has little textual support in the• • 63
historical development of the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence. To
the extent that much of the existing federalism jurisprudence cannot be traced to
any constitutional provision, other than the structure of the Constitution as a
whole, the functional or economic theory of federalism has the advantage of
giving substantive effect to principles of state sovereignty and autonomy without
unduly limiting federal supremacy in its enumerated spheres of power, or relying
on judicial line-drawing around vague notions of integral state functions or a
sense of the intended balance of state and federal power. In addition, by relying
on structural features, such as anti-commandeering or intergovernmental
bargaining, to protect or maintain the role of the states in our federalist system, it
places much of the power and responsibility of federalism in the hands of the
governmental parties themselves. In this respect, this framework seems to be a
direct outgrowth of Garcia's assertion that influence through the political
process is the means by which the framer's envisioned the federalist balance
being maintained.
64
Turning from federalism generally to the particular issue of immigration,
thinking about immigration federalism through such an economic frame has a lot
to offer our analysis thus far. Compared to the dueling sovereign or separate
spheres paradigm, the cooperative and enforcement-oriented vision contained in
the economic framework here seems better suited to capture the nuances of the
federal-state relationship in the immigration context. This is due in some part to
the fact that immigration is one of the few regulatory fields in which the gap
between policy-making and policy implementation is particularly acute.
However, the economic model also draws support from the specific way in
which federal and state authorities relate to one another with regard to the issue
of immigration. Unlike the typical adversarial mold of federalism, the federalist
developments of our immigration system often seem to reflect a more muted
bargaining between state and federal governments.
Take for example the federalization of immigration law that took place in
the nineteenth century, which transformed immigration from what had largely
63. See id. at 939.
64. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985) ("[T]he principal
and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that inherent in all congressional action - the




been a state and local matter, to one of national importance. 65 It is not difficult
to see this transition as a stunning rebuke of state power and local interests in
favor of federal jurisdiction. Indeed, this was the conceptual frame that the
Supreme Court employed while engineering this transfer of regulatory power.66
From a political perspective however, it is not clear that either the federal or
the state government saw it in this light. Notwithstanding the Court's dire
pronouncement of the various national interests over immigration threatened by
state control, the immigration regime that the federal government first
implemented mostly replicated existing state policies. 67 At the same time, most
states were quite eager to embrace federal control because it relieved them of
fiscal costs, and placed enforcement responsibilities on a level of government
that was better suited to effectuate its demands.
68
Federal control made possible enforcement techniques that the states were
desperately trying to put into place when the Supreme Court intervened. It was
largely shifts in regulatory technique - namely, state attempts to streamline and
outsource its immigration review process by imposing broad or universal fee and
bonding requirements upon steamship carriers - and not radical changes of
immigration policy that spurred the courts to denounce local regulations of
immigration in the mid- to late-nineteenth century. 69 It was the federal
government's ability to put the state's regulatory vision into effect, not just
through the continuation of similar fee and bonding requirements, 70 but
ultimately by implementing a system of "remote control" through the use of
federal consular offices as off-shore screening posts, that many now see as one
of the most pivotal and immediate effects of federalization.
71
A similar alignment of interests also characterizes much of the federal-state
relationship today as the primary focus of immigration enforcement shifts from
remote or entrance controls to interior enforcement and local surveillance, it is
not surprising that the trend has been towards devolution of enforcement
65. See generally Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of Immigration Law, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1833 (1993) (summarizing state and local immigration regulations before the so-called
federalization).
66. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U. S. 581, 605-06 (1889); see also Chy Lung v.
Freedman, 92 U. S. 275, 279-80 (1875).
67. DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN AMERICA
69 (2002) (noting that federal regulations "essentially nationalized state policies governing
European immigration that had been struck down by the Court.")
68. See, e.g., LucY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE
SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 5-6 (1995).
69. See Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283 (1849); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 268,
274 (1875).
70. See Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
71. See ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN 211, 240-41, 264-67 (2006).
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responsibilities. Putting aside the increased anti-immigration rhetoric emerging
from state and local leaders, most sub-federal efforts to enforce immigration
laws today seem to be prompted by the availability, or at least the promise, of
federal incentives.
For example, there may be several reasons why the federal government's
Section 287(g) program, 7 2 which allows state and local governments to enter
into an agreement with the federal government to enforce immigration laws, was
largely ignored in the several years after its legislative enactment. 73 It seems
more than coincidental that state and local involvement in this program
increased 74 around the time the federal government essentially decided to
increase the price that it was willing to pay to purchase the services of the states
by offering state and local jails partial reimbursement for the housing cost of any
prisoner who also happened to be illegally present in the United States, and
allowing prisoners so identified to be released into federal custody before
serving out their full sentence. 75  This is not to say that there are no local
interests involved in the decision of states and localities to take on what had
normally been viewed as a federal responsibility. Many of these decisions seem
to be prompted in large part by the federal government's own determination that
it is more economically efficient to recruit state or local services than to broaden
its own enforcement capabilities. This may be another reason why 287(g)
72. Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).
73. The 287(g) program was enacted into law in 1996 and Florida became the first state to enter
into such an agreement in 2002. Jeff Sessions & Cynthia Hayden, The Growing Role for State &
Local Law Enforcement in the Realm of Immigration Law, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 323, 346
(2005).
74. In the six years after Florida signed up with the 287(g) program, there are at least 41 active
287(g) Memorandum of Agreements in effect. See ICE.gov, Partners,
http://www.ice.gov/partners/287g/Section287-g.htm (last visited April 15, 2008).
75. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, FACT SHEET: SECTION 287 (G)
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT 2 (Aug. 16, 2006), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/pi/news/factsheets/060816dc287gfactsheet.pdf ("In November 2005,
the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) began processing alien inmates at their Intake
Center as part of the 287(G) program. By processing aliens who met the criteria for early release
and turning them over to ICE for removal, the ADC has realized a cost savings of $2,985,655 and
a savings of 53,135 bed days."); Kristin Collins, Sheriffs Help Feds Deport Illegal Aliens, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 22, 2007, at Al ("[Sheriff] Johnson said the [section 287(g)]
program has dual benefits for Alamance County. It brings in money because, the federal
government pays about $66 a night for every immigration detainee who stays in jail. And it rids
the county of illegal immigrants, who he contends sponge public resources and are more prone to
commit crimes than legal residents.").
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programs are growing in regions where federal enforcement deficiencies are
especially pronounced.
76
The fact is cooperative bargaining, rather than dueling sovereigns, appears
to be a more accurate model of the federal-state relationship in the immigration
context. It makes sense to think about immigration federalism with an eye to
how or even whether the legal structure promotes federal-state interactions that
increase the efficiency of the underlying policy by forcing the parties involved to
internalize the costs, and balance that against its actual interests. It is possible to
read much of the recent support for a more expansive sub-federal role as being
based on the recognition that state and local governments are often better
situated than the federal government with regard to enforcement or integration
costs. 77 Similarly, it is possible to see instances where states and localities have
resisted cooperating with federal officials not simply as symbolic
denouncements of federal immigration policy or purposeful attempts to frustrate
immigration enforcement, but also as situations where states and localities find it
too costly to do so. To the extent that federalism requires the federal
government to internalize the administrative costs of their programs and prevents
it from commandeering local resources, this simply means that the federal
government should assess whether it is more expensive to replicate similar
enforcement capabilities or offer incentives sufficient enough to offset any given
state or locality's perceived costs. If, as many argue, local enforcement is truly
less costly overall than increased federal surveillance, than a deal reflecting this
efficiency can certainly be reached.
Thus, an economic framework of immigration federalism would seem to
suggest that while the federal government should be allowed to recruit the
assistance of state governments in their effort to implement its immigration
regime, it should tread lightly when attemptin% to circumvent local refusal
through regulatory, rather than economic, means. What remains unanswered,
76. See, e.g. Mick Hunton, GOP Senator Wants Parts of Law Repealed, TULSA WORLD, Dec. 5,
2007, at Al (describing state enforcement of immigration being implemented "at a time when
federal immigration offers as scarce").
77. See Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local
Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 181 (2005) (discussing enforcement);
Rodriguez, supra note 2 at 581 (discussing integration of local officials).
78. Congress's anti-sanctuary provisions, which prohibit states and localities from refusing to
cooperate with federal enforcement efforts but does not directly require such cooperation, seems to
sit close to this line. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 § 434, 8 U.S.C. § 1644 (2006) (prohibiting state and local governments from placing
restrictions on government employees who wish to provide immigration information to federal
authorities); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 §
642, 8 U.S.C.A § 1373 (2008) (prohibiting state and local governments from placing restrictions
on government employees who wish to provide immigration information to federal authorities);
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however, is the extent to which, under this model, the states should be allowed to
enforce immigration laws on their own initiative (with or without the imprimatur
of federal support) or craft related immigration regulations on their own.
This question is not as simple as it might first appear. If the rationale
behind the promotion of intergovernmental bargaining is to ensure the efficient
development and implementation of federal law, then regulatory initiatives at the
state level, especially those not taken at the specific bequest of the federal
government, seem more likely to undermine than advance those aims. It would
appear to raise the risk that a patchwork system of immigration regulations
would emerge, thereby threatening the enforcement advantages that the
federalization of immigration law first brought about. More than simply forcing
the federal government to regulate, and implement those regulations, in an
efficient manner by requiring it to internalize the political and administrative
cost of its actions, sub-federal involvement seems to raise the figurative cost of
doing business in a counterproductive manner. The resulting regulatory regime
would then likely be less cost-effective overall than if the federal government
selectively seeks out state assistance when it is prudent for it to do so.
Alternatively, if state efforts to regulate immigration lean more toward
initiatives that replicate federal enforcement efforts or comport with the
substantive intent of the federal regime, then state involvement in this matter
merely restores the efficiency promises of federal uniformity and overcomes
situations where federal holdouts raise the overall cost of implementing a truly
national immigration system. Although substantive federal immigration laws
apply uniformly across the country, the practical realities of limited fiscal
resources means that the laws are not enforced uniformly in all areas. This is
often justified by the fact that immigration violations are not significant issues in
all parts of the United States.
It makes sense that border states like California and Texas, as well as other
gateways such as New York, are the focus of interior enforcement efforts.
Immigration flows often shift faster than the federal government's ability to alter
the allocation of federal resources and mismatches are bound to occur. It is no
surprise that many immigration regulations undertaken at the local level occur in
states where federal immigration officials are scant and immigration-related
facilities lacking. The intent behind many of these efforts is ultimately to
compel federal authorities to extend its coverage to these areas. In light of this,
one can still argue that there is good reason to require the federal government to
coordinate how it wants to reorient its enforcement capabilities and request, or
purchase state cooperation when necessary. Assuming that the overarching goal
is the efficient actualization of the federal regulatory regime, then it is the states




who are often most aware of where enforcement gaps exist. It is not clear that
the opposite presumption - allowing state initiative with the possibility of
federal preemption - might not serve those interests just as well, if not better.
If we are to take the economic analogy further, state initiatives that remain
within the broader substantive parameters of federal immigration law might
merit encouragement on the basis of furthering an optimal balance of
cooperative federalism. Cast in the mold of a counteroffer, state regulatory
efforts might be seen as a means of facilitating federal objectives while
minimizing the indirect costs that federal enforcement imposes on states,
especially at the local level. Considering the myriad interests involved in
immigration, there is no reason to believe that the federal government is always
in the best position to craft the most politically, or cost-effective, enforcement
strategy.
A state may believe that local sanctions on employers or landlords are
better suited to its circumstances than increased federal raids or other forms of
intrusive federal intervention. Moreover, states may wish to integrate their
enforcement regime with other state programs, like child welfare services or
community policing efforts. 79 Allowing states to take the initiative accentuates
their presence at the bargaining table without unduly increasing their bargaining
position. Assuming the results are comparable to direct federal enforcement, the
federal government may well agree to permit such alternatives by staying the use
of its preemption powers, which always remains available if circumstances
change. As Hills argues, one reason for a federalism regime that prohibits
federal commandeering while allowing federal recruitment of state support is to
encourage states to invest in their capacity to offer assistance to the federal
government if necessary. 8 Reversing the presumption with regard to state
initiatives in the immigration context arguably serves this objective as well.
To be sure, the analysis up to this point assumes a straightforward
relationship between the substantive rule and the enforcement regime; namely
that the latter serves to actualize the intent set forth by the former. In the
immigration context, however, there are legitimate concerns that this may not
actually be the case. Because of the chronic mismatch between our immigration
laws and the realities of enforcement, many now see the enforcement regime,
rather than the underlying law, as America's true immigration policy.
Even the Supreme Court has on occasion expressed the belief that our
regime of incomplete enforcement is a better reflection of Congressional intent
79. Cf Yvonne Abraham, As Immigration Raids Rise, Human Toll Decried: Arrests Across
US. Break up Families, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 20, 2007, at Al (describing state frustration with the
effects of immigration raids that leave children stranded, and the failure of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement to coordinate with state officials).
80. See Hills, supra note 60, at 893 - 94.
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than the laws themselves. 8 1 Thus, state efforts to enforce federal immigration
laws beyond those of federal efforts can be understood to be a per se frustration
of the de facto immigration policy of this country, especially if it produces
peripheral consequences that the federal government may be purposely trying to
avoid. 82 Even from this perspective, however, it seems than an economic model
of federalism offers important insights. Indeed, it suggests that the focus of any
federalist inquiry should be on the intricacies of implementation rather than just
the balance of rulemaking.
III.
Instead of seeing the federal-state relationship as dueling sovereigns or
transacting parties, a third approach is to understand it as a set of overlapping
communities. The aim of federalism then is to establish a framework to mediate
their sometimes competing efforts to define the characteristics and membership
of their communities, and the consequences of being an outsider - to determine
how the law reconciles the organization of the federal government and the states
as political communities both nested and distinct, and their simultaneous claims
upon the same individuals in and outside their jurisdiction. From this
perspective, immigration federalism cannot be understood outside the ongoing
debate over the mutual relevance of these communities and the consequences
and significance of having membership in each.
This reading of federalism draws support from the fact that federalism
issues can often be construed as disputes over membership rules. As a result,
resolution of these cases often depends on the extent to which national
citizenship and the constitutional core of our "Union" trumps the right of states
to exist and operate as distinct political (if not social or cultural) communities of
interest. In this regard, this particular framework of federalism shares much of
the same concerns raised in some of the previous frameworks. Under a system
of governance based on "we the people," it is difficult to imagine the existence
of states as states apart from the membership that constitutes its communal and
political existence. Similarly, it is difficult to imagine a sphere of jurisdiction
substantively tied to the scope of local interest or concern that does not involve
distinguishing the individuals who are a part of the state, and those who are not.
Of course, the same can be said with regard to how we define the federal
81. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 218,218 n.17 (1982).
82. Cf id. at 230 (raising concern that state law prohibiting free public education to illegal
immigrants will lead to the creation of a semi-permanent subclass, which could be worse than the
problems associated with illegal immigration); Wishnie, supra note 3, at 553 (fearing that state or




government vis-A-vis the state, and the proper or legitimate scope of federal
power.
Many bodies of case law, including many that we have examined, can be
assimilated into this view of federalism. Commerce Clause cases can often be
boiled down to the degree to which states are allowed to prefer their own
members in the national marketplace. The anti-commandeering cases can
similarly be cast as disputes over whether state resources are collectively owned
by the people of the union as a whole, or the subset of individuals that
collectively constitute the political existence of a given state. Another body of
case law, however, is also worth considering: the right to travel and residency
requirement cases. Taken together, they reflect the unsettled federalism terrain
over the relevance of states and the federal government as communal
institutions, and whether we relate to each hierarchically or independently.
Consider how these cases fall. On one hand, since the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment and its repudiation of Dred Scott,83 the Court has on
many occasions asserted a constitutional right to travel, and has scrutinized state
laws that in any way impede this right. Thus, in cases like Shapiro v.
Thompson 84 and more recently in Saenz v. Roe, 85 the Court has struck down
durational residency requirements for the receipt of any state benefits, even
though none of these laws erected borders that directly limited the ability of
people to cross state lines or seek residency in another state. 86 In the Court's
view, the issue in these cases was not solely whether there is a real or sufficient
deterrence to interstate mobility, but rather that deterrence does not frustrate the
intent of our federalist structure. While federalism split governmental
sovereignty, it was also meant to ensure that an individual's political
membership in one is not undermined by his political membership (or lack
thereof) in the other.
87
On the other hand, the Court has been quite tolerant of state efforts to
restrict certain benefits to bona fide residents. The Court upheld, among others,
the right of states to limit in-state tuition at public universities to residents of the
state. 88  In doing so, the Court has been willing to sanction idiosyncratic
83. See generally Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (holding that an African-
American descendent of slaves is not a citizen of the United States, and cannot be granted
citizenship by any state in the union).
84. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
85. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
86. See id. at 501 ("Given that [the state law] imposed no obstacle to respondents' entry into
California, we think the State is correct when it argues that the statute does not directly impair the
exercise of the right to free interstate movement.").
87. Id. at 504.
88. Stains v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D.Minn. 1970), affd per curiam, 401 U.S. 985
(1971); see also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441,453 (1973).
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residency requirements. For example, in Martinez v. Bynum, the Court upheld a
state law that denied free public education to a United States citizen whose
parents lived in Mexico because, although physically residing in a locality in the
state, he was determined to have been present for "the primary purpose of
attending the public free schools," which prevented him from becoming a
resident under state law. 89
The problem, of course, is that the practical effects of these decisions
cannot be easily distinguished from one another. The burden placed by the state
upon an indigent citizen's right to travel in Shapiro by denying welfare
assistance to new residents is not unlike the burden that a state places upon a
poor college student interested in leaving his state of residency for better
educational opportunities elsewhere who can't afford to pay out-of-state tuition.
Similarly, the Court's acceptance of the residency requirement in Martinez as
rational effectively prevented an American citizen from moving to Texas and
possibly from residing in the United States altogether.
Of course, it is not difficult to imagine the federalism concerns that would
arise if the Court were to take any one of these decisions to the most logical
extreme. It can be argued that going too far in either direction would undermine
the existence of the federal government or states as relevant communities of
interest at all, even if some system of dual sovereignty and administrative power
is possible. To the extent that federalism is interested not just in the exercise of
power in the abstract, but in the community from which such powers are thought
to manifest, these struggles are inherently a part of the ongoing project of
federalism itself.
89. Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 323, 328-29, 334 (1983) ("[A bono fide residency
requirement ] does not burden or penalize the constitutional right of interstate travel, for any
person is free to move to a State and to establish residence there. [It] simply requires that the
person does establish residence before demanding the services that are restricted to residents.").
This is especially interesting given that in Shapiro, the Court specifically balked at the idea that a
state should be able to "bar new residents from schools, parks, and libraries or deprive them of
police and fire protection." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 632 (1969). Of course, even
though interstate (indeed, international) migration was involved, it could be that the Court saw it
primarily as an issue involving local boundaries. In contrast to the interstate context, the Court has
traditionally been unwilling to subject interlocal barriers to mobility to heightened scrutiny. See
e.g., Belle Terre v. Boraas , 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding local ordinance that prohibited more
than two unrelated individuals to live in the same household); see Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (upholding local zoning ordinance against equal
protection challenge notwithstanding disparate racial impact because no discriminatory racial
intent could be shown); see also Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REv.
371, 460 (2001) ("What is quite stunning is the radical disjuncture between Saenz's rigorous attack
on a statute that would make it marginally less attractive for poor residents from other states to
move to California and Warth[][ v. Seldin's, 422 U.S. 490 (1975),] equally rigorous defense of an
exclusionary zoning regime that makes it virtually impossible for poor residents from a nearby
town to move into Penfield.").
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As hinted at by Martinez, when the divide between residents and
nonresidents is merged with the issue of immigration, the federalism issue
becomes even more complex. The reason is because non-citizen immigrants, or
aliens, occupy a third type of residency status that does not clearly fit into the
community or membership structure of either the nation or the states. Formally
outside the national polity, they are nevertheless recognized by federal statuses
and protected as "persons" in the constitutional fold. At the same time, their
relationship with the state is even murkier. By nature of being in the United
States, they are necessarily physically present in a state: the conventional
hallmark of state residency. Notwithstanding their physical presence however,
they are also not citizens of the United States, which is the typical basis for
challenging state discrimination against outsiders.
92
The Courts have struggled with how aliens fit into the federalist structure of
political communities. In some instances, the Court appears to be of the opinion
that membership in the federal polity should be of little relevance or
consequence to states when considering how they determine membership. For
example, in Graham v. Richardson, the Court struck down a state law that
limited access by certain aliens to state health benefits in part by noting that from
the state's perspective, immigrants were no different than any other state resident
and indeed may be more of a resident than recent migrants from another state.
93
Reaffirming Shapiro, the Court indicated that it was unwilling to categorically
limit the logic of the right to travel cases to citizens. 94 Similarly, an attempt to
90. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) ("The Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens.... These provisions are universal in
their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences
of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection
of equal laws.").
91. See infra note and text accompany note 95.
92. To the extent that right to travel cases are based on the Privileges and Immunities Clause
and an emphasis on the importance of citizenship, it "also illustrates the perils of the citizenship
project ... [by] appear[ing] to draw an indelible line between the rights of citizens and aliens." T.
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLENCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 70 - 71 (2002).
93. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) ("We agree with the three-judge court in
the Pennsylvania case that the 'justification of limiting expenses is particularly inappropriate and
unreasonable when the discriminated class consists of aliens. Aliens like citizens pay taxes and
may be called into the armed forces. Unlike the short-term residents in Shapiro, aliens may live
within a state for many years, work in the state and contribute to the economic growth of the state.'
There can be no 'special public interest' in tax revenues to which aliens have contributed on an
equal basis with the residents of the State.") (quoting Leer v. Sailer, 321 F. Supp. 250, 253 (E.D.
Pa. 1970)) (citations omitted)).
94. Graham, 403 U.S. at 375-76 (stating that the Court "has never decided whether the right [to
travel] applies specifically to aliens, and it is unnecessary to reach that question here" and
explaining that "[i]t is enough to say that the classification involved in Shapiro was subjected to
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justify a discriminatory state statute as a bona fide residency requirement in
Plyler v. Doe, which involved a Texas law that allowed schools to deny free
public education to illegal immigrant children, was also rejected by the Court on
the ground that it did not comport with "established standards by which the State
historically tests residence" based on simply being physically present as a
resident.
9
In other cases, however, the Court has relied on an alien's standing with the
national polity as a baseline for assessing state attempts to circumscribe the
bounds of its community on the basis of federal citizenship. The consequences
of doing so have not been uniform. However, they have been justified
retrospectively by the Court on the basis of the government function involved. 96
Thus, in cases like Truax v. Raich and Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commision,
the Court construed legally admitted aliens as essentially guests of the federal
government, and thus imbued with rights stemming from having a form of
membership, however incomplete, in the national polity. 97  Echoing the
language of the right to travel language of Shapiro and Saenz and their
invocation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Court in Takahashi
described Traux as holding that aliens, through their admittance by the federal
government, possessed "a federal privilege to enter and abide in 'any state in the
Union' and thereafter under the Fourteenth Amendment."
' 98
At the same time, the Court has invoked national citizenship criteria, even
those that are explicitly based on race, to justify state measures that discriminate
strict scrutiny under the compelling state interest test, not because it was based on any suspect
criterion such as race, nationality, or alienage, but because it impinged upon the fundamental right
of interstate movement.").
95. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 227 n.22 (1982); id. at 229 ("In terms of educational cost and
need, however, undocumented children are 'basically indistinguishable' from legally resident alien
children."); see also id. at 250-51 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The Court has failed to offer even a
plausible explanation why illegality of residence in this country is not a factor that may
legitimately bear upon the bona fides of state residence and entitlement to the benefits of lawful
residence.").
96. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 440 (1982) (reorganizing the equal protection
jurisprudence regarding aliens by replacing "the old public/private distinction" with one "between
the economic and political functions of government.").
97. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 42 (1915) (holding that states cannot deny "those
lawfully admitted to the country under the authority of the acts of Congress" from "enjoying in a
substantial sense and in their full scope the privileges conferred by the admission" or cause them to
be "segregated in such of the states as chose to offer hospitality."); Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 419, (1948) (interpreting a provision of a post-war Civil Rights Act, enacted to
protect voting rights of newly freed slaves and ensure their equal citizenship, as not only applicable
to aliens, but as a part of Congress' "comprehensive legislative plan for the nation-wide control
and regulation of immigration and naturalization").
98. Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 415.
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on race indirectly by relying on federal classification. 99  The Court has also
pointed to an alien's exclusion from the national polity under federal law as the
baseline presumption for his standing with regard to all political communities.
In a number of cases that can be traced back to Graham, the Court all but
abandoned the careful parsing of state and federal citizenship by holding, with
regard to a state-level classifications, that "[t]he exclusion of aliens from basic
governmental processes is... a necessary consequence of the community's
process of political self-definition .... Aliens are by definition those outside of
this community." 1
00
With Sugarman v. Dougall, the Court planted the seed for what would later
become the political function doctrine by recognizing that a state's interest in
establishing its own form of government may require it to "limit[] participation
in that government to those who are within 'the basic conception of a political
community."' 101 The Court would turn these comments into a powerful and
expansive exception. 102 Thus, in cases like Ambach v. Norwich and Cabell v.
Chavez-Salido, the Court held that citizenship requirements for public school
teachers 103 and parole officers 104 respectively were legitimate efforts by the
state the preserve representative government and thus were subject to less
judicial scrutiny. In the Court's view, the very concepts of membership and
community were at stake. Without employing something like the political
function doctrine, the Court risked "obliterat[ing] all the distinctions between
citizens and aliens, and thus depreciat[ing] the historic values of citizenship." 1
05
What is striking about these decisions is that in spite of the addition of
alienage, the results and the reasoning do not deviate much from those
underlying the Court's right to travel and residency requirement decisions. In
many ways, both invoke and wrestle with the federalist tension between the
federal government and states as overlapping communities, and the
consequences of having full or even partial membership in one, the other, or
99. See Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 220 (1923) ("The State properly may assume that
the considerations upon which Congress made such classification are substantial and reasonable.
Generally speaking, the natives of European countries are eligible. Japanese, Chinese and Malays
are not. Appellants' contention that the state act discriminates arbitrarily against Nakatsuka and
other ineligible aliens because of their race and color is without foundation.").
100. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1982).
101. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973) (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
334 (1972)).
102. See Cabell, 454 U.S. at 458 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that "Sugarman's exception
[now] swallows Sugarman's rule").
103. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-80 (1979).
104. See Cabell, 454 U.S. at 445-47.
105. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U. S. 295, 295 (quoting Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 14 (1977)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
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both. In both fields the Court seems to recognize that community self-definition
at the federal and state level, though sometimes conflicting, are not only
prerogatives of, but also prerequisites to, being such a community.
From this perspective, the recent proliferation of immigration-related state
laws is neither unique nor unprecedented; it is merely the most recent attempt by
states to define their community in opposition to, and by stemming the flow of,
outsiders. It suggests, for example, that the California statute enacted in part to
stem the influx of "Okies" from Oklahoma during the Dust Bowl period struck
down in Edwards v. California,10 6 one of the Court's earliest right to travel
cases, is not unlike the recent attempt by Oklahoma to deter the international and
interstate migration of illegal (and possibly legal) immigrants flowing in from
other countries or other states. The fact is local initiatives with regard to
immigration enforcement in recent years are often just as interested in steering
immigrants to other states as they are in returning them to their country-of-
origin. Indeed, alongside state concerns that an influx of immigrants will turn
their community into a third-world country, 10 8 one frequently finds worry that
their state will become the next California. 109 How one reacts to these concerns
is invariably tied to one's perception of states as distinct communities in our
federalist system.
Immigration does change how we resolve this federalist tension in at least
one respect. Even if we accept that federalism requires deference when a state
acts to define itself as a community to serve the interests of its citizens at the
expense of outsiders, it is not clear that this objective is well served by the
increasing use of alienage as a dividing line at the state level. Although it may
appear at first to be an appropriate compromise given that it relies on a
distinction embedded in federal law, it can be argued that to expand the
relevance of federal membership rules in this manner, as the Court did in Cabell,
106. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); see also TIM CRESSWELL, MOBILITY IN THE
MODERN WESTERN WORLD 148 (2006).
107. See Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2007, H.B. 1804, 51st Leg., 1 st Reg.
Sess. (Okla. 2007); see also Angel Riggs, State Curb on Aid to Illegals Weighed, TULSA WORLD,
Mar. 27, 2006, Al (describing Randy Terril, the sponsor of H.B. 1804, as saying years before that
bill was passed: "As other states tighten immigration laws ... more illegal residents are turning to
Tulsa, Oklahoma City and other smaller Oklahoma cities.").
108. See, e.g., Andrea Walker, N.Y. Group Critical of Immigration Policy: Billboard Messages
Erected in 4 N.C. Cities, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Nov. 17, 1999, at C1 (quoting Herbert Berry of
Chapel Hill: "Our immigrant numbers must be reduced, otherwise we will turn into a Third World
country with billions of people and a lot of problems.").
109. See, e.g., So They Said, WICHITA EAGLE, Feb. 17, 2008, at I IA (quoting State Senator
Peggy Palmer: "Because other states are doing something, it forces us to. I don't think we want to
become like California. There is a danger factor there.").
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only serves to further erode the status of states as a distinct and independent
community of interest.
In this respect, although Graham struck down a state effort to cast alien
residents out of the state polity, the Court's requirement that states offer
compelling reasons for relying on federal immigration status in this manner may
have counter-intuitively led states to think about the place and role of its
membership rules apart from the federal membership regime, even or especially
as the salience of that regime continues to grow. Conversely, to avoid the role of
the state polity becoming no more than a convenient administrative subdivision
of the federal government 110 may require that states be permitted some leeway
to define state membership criteria with regard to aliens in ways not intended by
federal law.' 1' It can be argued that members of the Court hinted at this
complexity in cases like Ambach, in which the dissent, to illustrate "how shallow
and indistinct is New York's line of demarcation between citizenship and
noncitizenship" noted the irony of the regulatory scheme in question, which
prohibited noncitizens from becoming public schoolteachers but permitted
noncitizens to vote for, and serve on, local school boards that possessed
extensive power to hire and fire schoolteachers and craft many aspects of the
school curriculum. "1
2
In short, not unlike the other approaches to federalism explored above, the
community approach here shows that immigration both raises and complicates
federalism concerns in different ways. This is due in part to the contested nature
of the federal government and the states as political communities, as some of the
analysis above shows. It is also the consequence, however, of how the relative
salience of these communities in our everyday lives has changed since the
federalist structure was put into place. Dissenting in Garcia, Justice Powell
argued that separate and distinct sovereign spheres needed to be delineated and
maintained not necessarily for its own sake, but to effectuate the structural
protection stemming from state political influence that formed the basis of the
majority's opinion.
In his view, for the states to be an effective "counterpoise" to federal power
in the political realm, it must be able to "attract and retain the loyalty of their
110. Cf Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) ("Municipal corporations are political
subdivisions of the state, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental
powers of the state as may be intrusted [sic] to them."); see Richard T. Ford, Law's Territory (A
History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843, 850, 858 - 62 (1992) (arguing that the law
oscillates between seeing localities as organic jurisdictions representing an authentic community,
and synthetic jurisdictions created for the administrative convenience of the state).
111. Cf generally Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional
and Theoretical Meanings ofAlien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391 (1992-1993) (describing the
long historical practice of non-citizen voting at the state and local level).
112. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 86 (1979).
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citizens" by remaining relevant with regard to their everyday concerns. 113 A
number of developments outside of doctrinal developments, including the
increasing mobility of individuals in American society, have undermined the
degree to which individuals identify with, or express loyalty to, any given state
as a community of interest. Nevertheless, as the analysis here suggests, although
such federalism concerns extend into the immigration context, it is not always
possible to apply federalism directly or in a straightforward manner without
taking into account the particular frame of federalism involved and how the
terms of the debate shift with the introduction of federal immigration laws.
IV. CONCLUSION
The wave of immigration-related activity at the state and local level in
recent years has prompted many to examine what role, if any, federalism plays in
the immigration context. With few exceptions, however, the discourse thus far
has been relatively limited and largely results-oriented. Those who support
greater enforcement of existing immigration laws or favor expanding restrictions
on immigration in general often lend support to efforts to regulate immigration at
the sub-federal level for this reason, while critics of the current immigration
regime tend to assert federal exclusivity in response. In this regard, federalism is
often no more than new clothes on an old debate.
It is far too early to tell whether an explicit doctrine of immigration
federalism will emerge, or what form that doctrine might take. Nevertheless, as
the analysis here suggests, the foundation for such a doctrine can already be
detected in much of the existing immigration jurisprudence, especially if they are
understood as part of the evolving doctrines of federalism as a whole. To the
extent immigration federalism draws upon the insights of the federalism, a rich
body of doctrine exists to guide our understanding of what immigration
federalism should be. At the same time, to the extent immigration federalism is
tied to the development of federalism more generally, it is unlikely that a
coherent doctrine of immigration federalism will emerge anytime soon. Only by
foregrounding the nuances and multiple facets of the federalism debate can we
begin to understand the role that it plays, or will play, in the immigration
context.
113. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556, 571 (1985) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
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